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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the concept of equality and its role in the politics and economics of distributing social goods, costs, authority, and value. Specifically addressed is the question of who is to be made equal to whom. Various definitions to be considered in answering this question are examined: (1) simple subject-regarding equality: (2) inclusive equality: (3) exclusive equality: (4) segmental equality: and (5) bloc-regarding equality. The different implications of each of these definitions are related to the issue of equality between and among groups distinguished by race, sex, age, or other social characteristics. Some examples are given based on data regarding race and sex differences in income and unemployment in the United States. (Author/GC)

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NO PERSON IS AN ISLAND:

THE ISSUE OF EQUALITY

AMONG GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS

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Introduction

"Equality" permeates nearly every neighborhood of human culture.[1] It is the relationship among the numbers 2, 2, and 4, the meaning of a balanced budget, or a 3-3 score in the seventh inning, or a fair market trade. It is part of truth itself--an equation between an assertion and the things to which the assertion refers. Even personal identity ("I'm me") floats upon a conception of equality so deep, so obvious, so simple that it mostly escapes our attention. Equality may be one of the few ideas essential to all human cultures: try to think of any society which operates without explicit or implicit reliance upon it.

Here, we focus on only one small segment of the idea of equality--its role in the politics and economics of distributing social goods, social bads, authority, and values. Furthermore, we narrow the focus even more sharply to consider only one aspect of that small segment--the question of who is to be made equal to whom. Our contention is that in many debates over politics and policy, the debaters are talking past one another because they define the subject of equality in different ways, and so they are really talking about different forms of equality. It is one thing to dispute over different values, or different priorities among values; that is the very essence of political discourse. But it is quite another to dispute simply because neither party understands what the other one is talking about, or because the parties differ in their perception of what, or whom, they are talking about. These latter forms of dispute are largely a waste of everyone's time, and we intend in this paper to clarify one element of any full definition of

equality--who is to be made equal to whom.[2]

A final introductory note about the nature of equality may be in order. De Tocqueville, among others, sees it as a single, monolithic, internally coherent program:

> . . . the gradual progress of equality is something fated. The main features of this progress are the following: it is universal and permanent, it is daily passing beyond human control, and every event and every man helps it along. . . . This whole book is written under the impulse of a kind of religious dread inspired by the contemplation of this irresistable revolution advancing century by century over every obstacle and even now going forward amid the ruins it has itself created.[3]

And yet, as the existence of this convention panel implies, the term "equality" encompasses a series of mutually antagonistic claims upon society and government. Equality is not a medieval cathedral, with walls and buttresses forming a complete, stable structure of appropriately interlocking parts. Rather it is a jester's church, some of whose walls can be raised only by knocking down others.[4] Thus Allan Bakke and the University of California at Davis should not be characterized as more or less egalitarian than each other, but as egalitarian in different ways. Bakke's type of equality can come only at the expense of U.C. Davis', and vice versa. It does no good to accuse either party of hypocrisy, or racism, or radical chic. They both seek equality; they cannot both achieve it. Our task here is partly to explain why not.

Baseball and Language Rights--the Subjects of Equality

Consider the following stories, which illustrate how the subjects of equality crucially affect one's definition of equality, and one's perception of whether or not it exists.

Race and Pay in Baseball

> It is commonly believed that baseball offers blacks the same rewards as it does to whites. This belief seems well founded:

in 1970, the average salary of black baseball players was actually higher than that of whites. The differential was considerable and held up across positions on the field. Black pitchers earned, on the average, about $21,000 more than white pitchers, black infielders about $12,000 more than white infielders, and black outfielders about $9,000 more than their white counterparts.[5] Such differences existed among superstars as well. Seven of the ten players making $100,000 or more (by 1970) were black.[6]

These statistics suggest that blacks have achieved--indeed, have surpassed--equality with whites in baseball. But many black players do not feel that they have been treated equally. They charge that widespread racial discrimination still exists in baseball, and that this racism comes clear only when salaries are compared at each level of performance. Their point is well taken. While it is true that blacks have on average higher salaries than whites, it is also true that "blacks on average earn less than whites of equal ability."[7] For instance, white infielders who bat around .280 earn approximately $4,000 more than black infielders with the same average. And, at the average level of outfield performance,[8] whites earn about 45% more than blacks.[9] This differential persists through all major league performance levels, and actually increases as performance improves.[10] Thus while seven out of the ten players earning over $100,000 were blacks, "Carl Yastrzemski earned $35,000 more than Hank Aaron and Willie Mays, even though Yaz had been playing fewer years and had not come close to matching Aaron's and May's performances."[11]

So, while blacks' salaries compare favorably to whites', blacks have to surpass whites in performance in order to earn equal pay. While blacks have achieved (even surpassed) equality of baseball income, they have not achieved equality in pay per crack of the bat.

The two claims in this tale implicitly agree that racial blocs (not single persons) form the subjects of equality: neither claim opposes inequality of incomes among persons in society or even in baseball. The contradiction is between equality in mean salaries by race, and equality of salary within each level of similarly productive players. In short, both claims seek equality across groups, but they define groups differently.

Now consider another story, in which the antagonists do not even agree that the issue lies in which group is the proper reference point.

Canada is a bilingual country: English and French are its official languages. All Canadians have the formal right to choose either as their native tongue. English, of course, is the language

of the majority. A sizable minority (about 27 percent of the population) claims French as its native tongue.

In Quebec (which is 80% francophone) the Parti Quebecois gained a majority of the seats in the provincial government in 1976. The party's program stresses the protection of the French culture in Quebec. In pursuit of this aim, the newly elected provincial government passed into law "Bill One"--a bill which purports to make French and only French the official language of the province. It requires "that most businesses, professional people and government offices conduct their affairs in French."[12] It also limits the number of students permitted to study English. The bill, in the words of The New York Times, makes Quebec "a French society."[13]

English speakers throughout Canada have of course attacked Bill One. They charge that it discriminates against English-speaking Canadians in a land where both English and French have always shared equal status. Why, ask the bill's opponents, should English speakers be forced to speak French in Quebec, when French speakers are allowed their choice of language in other provinces? Why should not all Canadians, English as well as French, have the same right to speak whatever language they choose? Why is equality among individuals in their right to choose a language not enough for the Quebecois?

It is not enough, responds the Parti Quebecois, because equality in speakers' rights to choose a language is not equivalent to equality among languages, and the cultures they embody. French Canadians have always suffered a lower standard of living than English Canadians, even in Quebec where they comprise the majority. The French Canadians feel that "there are penalties attached to being /and speaking/ French in Canada. English," they argue, "is the language in which the most important decisions in Canada are made, whether . . . in the scientific, economic, or political spheres."[14] As a result, French speakers are handicapped when forced to compete with English speakers. For example, in a town where 98 percent of the population is French Canadian, the big business in town has made English its working language. The English Canadian worker "can go ahead and improve himself in the technological field and take advantage of the first promotion that comes up, whereas the /French Canadian worker/ . . . has to spend hours, even years, mastering the second language."[15]

So, in the view of the Parti Quebecois, Bill One is designed "to make bilingualism a two-way street in Canada," and thereby to equalize the two cultures. Equality in the individual's right to choose his or her language has not led to equality of persons. Perhaps equalizing the burdens and benefits of the two cultures will.

In this problem we see another set of competing claims about the subjects of equality. Are all individuals to be made equal to all other individuals in their right to choose which language to speak? In that case, Bill

One blatantly discriminates against Anglophones in Quebec. Or are the two cultures to be made equal to one another in social status, economic well-being, political power? In that case, Bill One is a necessary means to bring the French culture up to the level of the English culture.

Within these two stories, then, we have three ways of conceiving the subject of equality. They are:



The difference between simple, segmental, and bloc-equal subjects of equality is not in literal content, not in the names of those who are to be equals, but in the structure by which those names are brought together. As these structures change, much more than literal content changes with them.

Simple Subject-Regarding Equalities

The simplest way to answer the question "Equality for whom?" is to define a class of subjects, and then to demand that each member of that class be the equal of all the rest. There is one class of equals, and one relation of equality repeated among all its members.[16]

Equality of this sort is commonly demanded in contemporary life. "One man one vote," for example, defines a class of equal citizens, granting each the same formal right to vote as any other. Any pairwise inequality in the "weight" of votes would count as a violation, no matter which pair of citizens we compare. Equal rights more generally--civil liberties of thought

and expression, rights to property, rights against arbitrary arrest, and the like--also usually fit this mold.[17] So too does the standard example of equality as a prima facie philosophical position:

> If I have a cake and there are ten persons among whom I wish to divide it, then if I give exactly one tenth to each, this will not . . . call for justification; whereas if I depart from this principle of equal division I am expected to produce a special reason.[18]

In addition, the basic notion of economic equality has (in most cases) this same structure; so does the Golden Rule or Kant's Categorical Imperative. Treat everyone as you would be treated, treat everyone as an end and not merely as a means. Even the price mechanism in market systems is partly an instance of simple subject-regarding equality: "2 for 79¢" is addressed to the whole class of shoppers who happen into the store, and it would be price discrimination to vary this figure from one customer to another. Both conceptual simplicity and practical application thus give this structure pride of place in our analysis.

1. Implicit, Variable, and Complex Subjects

As our examples imply, the subject class may be either explicit or implicit. A very important range of examples stems from the operative structure of general rules, laws, norms, or principles. As Isaiah Berlin suggests:

> All rules, by definition, entail a measure of equality. Insofar as rules are general instructions to act or refrain from acting in certain ways, in specified circumstances, enjoined upon persons of a specified kind, they enjoin uniform behavior . . . To fall under a rule is pro tanto to be assimilated to a single pattern. To enforce a rule is to promote equality of behavior or treatment.[19]

Since society fairly teams with rules, it also teams with subjects for equality. The sign "No Parking" means "no parking for anyone"; we are all, equally, its subjects. Even the Constitutional rule that the current President of the

United States is entitled to veto Congressional legislation sets up an implicit class of equals, those who are or will become President. Bentham's principle requiring society to serve "the greatest good of the greatest number" entails the implicit requirement that all the members of society count equally, viz, "each to count for one, none to count for more than one."

Subject classes may also be either fixed or variable. A fixed subject class has a definite list of numbers, as with "Everyone currently enrolled in this college" or "The top ten heavyweight contenders as of July 4, 1980." A variable subject class--such as all those subject to a general rule--has no enumerable set of members. A no-parking sign addresses itself to any motorist who happens by; the statutory laws of a polity address themselves to whomever comes into its territory. The subject structure may remain simple even if the language it uses to classify persons grows complicated. This false complexity occurs when several criteria bind a simple class of equals. Thus, for instance, I could define the class of male, Danish, unemployed victims of tuberculosis, and then insist upon equal medical treatment for all of them, pair by pair. That would be a simple, subject-regarding equality even though the language of classification had a fancy composition.[20]

2. Inclusive and Exclusive Subject Classes

Every subject class is an alternative to many rival classes: if I say that the As are to be equals, why should I not also or instead have said this of the Bs? If Smith and Jones are to be equal partners in this barrel of whiskey, why not Smith and Rae instead? Or every thirsty soul in town? Rival classes of equals multiply and compel choices and call for distinctions between exclusive and inclusive subject classes.

Consider the history of electoral suffrage in Western democracies.

Using an American vocabulary for instance:

1. Equal votes for propertied white men
2. Equality for white men
3. Equality for men
4. Equality for persons over 21 years of age
5. Equalities for persons over 18 years of age.

Each class of equals "swallows" the class before it and is therefore strictly inclusionary vis-à-vis its predecessor. The five claims present a neat chain of expansion, and some argue that egalitarianism always means choosing the broader subject.

By inclusionary equality, we intend a broad class of equals; by exclusionary equality, we mean a narrow class of equals. In its strict meaning, this distinction does not refer to a merely numerical relation, but to a relation of inclusion. Class One is inclusionary vis-à-vis Class Two, if (and only if) every member of One is also a member of Class Two, and some others belong to One but not to Two.[21] A weak sense of the distinction is merely numerical. If 100 subjects are in Class One, and only 99 are in Two, we have a weak version of this relation even if strict inclusion is not present. We will use the strict sense for most purposes.

As the suffrage example suggests, from an inclusionary viewpoint, exclusionary equalities will generally appear as inequalities, and as less moral. In Professor Berlin's cake-cutting story, the host might dine alone and eat the whole cake himself; or he might invite one intimate with whom to share it equally; and so on. Each choice would appear inegalitarian once one compared it to a longer guest list. Conversely, all manner of inequalities can be presented as exclusionary equalities. Consider South Africa.

By inclusionary standards, as a single national society, this regime is one of the most repressive and draconian systems of inequality in existence. However, if, as the Pretoria government would have us do, we think only about a long series of exclusionary equalities (e.g. in the "Republic" itself, in Transkei, in the other "homelands,") and forget about the fully inclusionary view, then the picture is altered radically. This is, of course, a primary motive for the dogma of separate development propounded by the white elite of that society.

Extending the point, equalities within whole nations--the U.S.A., West Germany, Chad, or Bengladesh--may correspond to radical inequalities on a world-inclusive basis.[22] The moral dilemma implied here should, and often does, alarm the proponent of equality within even the largest of national societies: why, exactly, are we to pursue equality only to the Mexican (or Polish) border?

However, the parable of the talents teaches us, among other things, not to assume automatically that inclusion is always better than exclusion. Consider the Book of Matthew:

> The kingdom of Heaven is like this. There was once a landowner who went out early one morning to hire labourers for his vineyard; and after agreeing to pay them the usual day's wage he sent them off to work. Going out three hours later he saw some more men standing idle in the marketplace. "Go and join the others in the vineyard," he said, "and I will pay you a fair wage"; so off they went. At midday he went out again, and at three in the afternoon, /and "an hour before sunset"/. When evening fell, the owner of the vineyard said to his steward, "Call the labourers and give them their pay, beginning with those who came last and ending with the first." Those who had started work an hour before sunset came forward, and were paid the full day's wage. When it was the turn of the men who had come first, they expected something extra, but were paid the same amount as the others. As they took it, they grumbled at their employer: "These late-comers have done only one hour's work, yet you have put them on a level with us, who have sweated the whole day long in the blazing sun!" The owner turned to one of them and said, "My friend, I am not being unfair to you. You agreed on the usual wage for the day, did you

> not? Take your pay and go home. I choose to pay the last man the same as you. Surely I am free to do what I like with my own money. Why be jealous because I am kind?" Thus will the last be first, and the first last.[23]

This parable is evidently meant to work on several levels, and was not meant for our immediate purpose. Our main point is that the exclusionary version of equality--a full day's pay only for a full day's work-- presents at least as good a case as its inclusionary alternative. Why indeed (on a literal reading) should the eleventh-hour workers be lumped with those who have sweated all day?

The other main point about inclusionary and exclusionary equality is that the former implies spatial centralization of power for its achievement. In decentralized systems, no agency can be held responsible for inclusionary equalities. In the limiting case, world-inclusive equalities cannot be achieved partly because there is no central power or authority against which such claims may be lodged. Less grandly, much of the demand for federal centralization in the U.S. since the New Deal has been based on the elementary insight that nationally inclusive equalities--in medical care, welfare, civil liberties for minorities--can be effected only through national authority.[24] And part of the difficulty underlying cases like Bakke is that decentralized units such as single universities attempt to achieve equalities far more inclusive than their authority (e.g. to admit their own students) extends. In general, a main contradiction for liberal egalitarians is the contradiction between a commitment to decentralized government on the one hand and to inclusive equalities on the other.

Consider, for example, decentralization to the level of the nation-state. Although moral egalitarianism recognizes no legitimate difference between an American citizen and a Mexican citizen, the American government

sees no practicable similarity between the two. If we are arguing on a high moral footing, and the subject of equality is mankind, then "All bona fide citizens of state X have a God-given right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness " sounds silly. Yet, given the existing arrangement of governments, very little can practicably be asserted for any larger group in the name of equality.

Or consider decentralization in a market economy. Suppose workers demand equalization of incomes within a single firm which must compete against other firms for labor, capital, and buyers. Such a firm faces an obvious dilemma: if it makes wages equal at the expense of its most skillful employees, these may flee to another firm. If, on the other hand, equality is accomplished by bringing marginal workers up to the level of more skillful employees, it may no longer be possible to compete for buyers or capital against "efficiently" inegalitarian firms. This point seems to provide an almost ineluctable restraint against equality in unregulated market systems.

The distinction between exclusive and inclusive subjects is entirely relative. A given class can be exclusive in relation to one alternativ and inclusive in relation to another. The class of all men is inclusive when compared to the class of all propertied men, yet exclusive when compared with the class of all persons. The distinction must, therefore, always be rooted in context, never in relation to a single detached notion of equality. Thus, say "Equality of X for all adult Americans" cannot be classified as inclusionary or as exclusionary by itself: only the relevant alternatives make such a classification meaningful.

Notice, finally, that the concepts of inclusivity and exclusivity in no way alter the interior structure of a subject-regarding equality. The

boundaries of such a class may be changed, but the basic structure remains simple.[25]

Segments and Blocs

Instead of merely altering the boundary around a class of equals, we might instead draw a line within it. Thus, if the original class of equals were "all American citizens," we might cleave this into blacks and non-blacks, employed and unemployed, homosexuals and heterosexuals. Or we might divide the "members" of I.B.M. into categories like stockholders, executives, union members, etc. Or Plato might have divided (did indeed divide) the citizenry of his utopian city into classes based on moral quality and property. By drawing internal distinctions like these, we destroy the simple subject-regarding structure just discussed, and open a path toward two basic alternative structures.

Recall our story about major league baseball above. At no point in that story is there any question of simple, subject-regarding equality. It is not suggested that all salaries in the major leagues (much less in the American economy) are or should be equal. The issues center instead upon subdivisions among baseball players, based on race or on position and quality of play. Neither is it suggested that there ought to be simple equality within the resulting blocs, e.g. that Willie Mays should have been paid the same as a rookie black shortstop, or that Carl Yastrzemski should have been paid no more than, say, Craig Nettles. Neither will the real structure of the baseball problem be understood by saying merely that it amounts to a question about a series of smaller classes of equals, such as outfielders batting around .280, pitchers with a 10-5 win-loss ratio, and so on. The story actually turns on two structural alternatives to simple subject-

regarding equality, which we call "segmental" and "bloc-regarding."

Momentarily, we will show how these concepts work in the baseball story, but let us begin more formally. Imagine a single class of equals, S, and then divide it into two or more subclasses, X and not-X (e.g. white and non-white, etc.).[26] Now, should we require equality within or between these subclasses? If we require equality within subclasses, we create a segmental subject structure; if we require equality between subclasses, we create a bloc-regarding subject structure. Each differs importantly from the simple structure with which we began, and each therefore requires separate discussion.

1. Segmental subjects of equality

A segmental subject structure is defined by two essential features: i) subjects of equality are divided into two or more mutually exclusive subclasses, and ii) pair-by-pair equality is required within, and not between, these subclasses. A segmental structure differs from a simple subject-regarding one in not being "simple," that is, in not simply defining one class of equals and leaving it undivided. It is, however, very like a simple structure in remaining subject-regarding; it focuses on pairwise equality inside each segment just as a simple structure focuses on pairwise equality within its only class. Schematically, we might have:



For segmental equality, we require equality among pairs A-B, A-C, and B-C on the one hand, and among pairs D-E, D-F, and E-F on the other hand. We do not require, and in general would not expect, equality among pairs

(e.g. A - F) belonging to different subclasses. If the overall class S remains fixed, segmentation diminishes equality in its simple sense, for some relations which would have been equalities now need not be so.

Indeed a very major example of segmentation is hierarchical systems of power and authority, in which each succeeding tier is explicitly subordinated to the tier above, but is equal within its membership. The military example is simplest: a five-star general outranks a lieutenant colonel, and a colonel outranks a major, but there is at least formal equality among five-star generals, among lieutenant colonels, among majors, and so on.

It may even be that segmental equality is required by all systematic forms of inequality. Treating people in a systematically unequal way requires first that they be divided into subclasses and then that members of each subclass be treated "equally unequally"--i.e. made equal with each other while remaining unequal to their superiors and inferiors. The segments of equality arise, in other words, in order to systematize inequality. The law of slavery, dividing freeman from slave, must, for its own stability, invest all freemen equally with the status and advantages of freedom, and must similarly invest all slaves equally with the status and disadvantages of slavery. There may be inequalities within each of the two status categories, but they will not derive from this phenomenon. Contemporary "credentialing" systems, e.g. systems of mobility based on degrees, certificates, and examinations are similar structures. These badges and tickets derive their systematic force from their uniformity, from the more or less homogeneous advantages which they confer upon their holders, and the uniform disadvantages, at least with regard to that facet of life, that they impose on non-holders.

Note that systems appearing to provide very broad and simple equality

may mask actual patterns of segmentation. Thus, on a Marxian analysis, the legal system of capitalism offers the appearance of universal rights to everyone. All are entitled to sell their property and to buy the property of others, to offer their labor as a commodity for sale and to buy this same commodity from others. Whereas medieval society had publicly and forthrightly stated the line of segmentation between lord and serf,[27] capitalism masks an analogous division between bourgeois and proletarian with the appearance of universal equality. The rights are equal, the inequality is just a question of having the property, the actual and potential means of production, to buy labor rather than to have one's labor bought.[28]

Just about any systematic division of labor in society creates a ground for segmentalism. In the simple case of baseball, positions on the field are bases for one form of segmental equality, viz., equality among shortstops, among catchers, etc.[29] In larger economies occupational positions are important determinants of income and prestige, so that benefits are more evenly distributed within a given occupation than, on average, between occupations. Indeed, class inequality in late-industrial societies may be based more on occupational lines than on classical Marxian ones, thus following function in production, rather than control over the means used in production.[30]

Note, finally, that equality within segmental structures sometimes resembles simple, subject-regarding equality between two groups with very different tastes and needs. Thus, to divide medical patients by their diseases, and then to give each disease-segment the treatment it most needs, may approximate an overall equality for the total group of sufferers. And, providing home economics classes for high school girls and woodshop courses for high school boys is inegalitarian only under a particular view of the differences between the sexes.

2. Bloc-Regarding Equalities

While there is a radical difference of structure between simple subject-regarding equality and segmentalism, both have persons as their direct referents. They are alike in always requiring that someone be someone else's equal. But it is a serious error to think that such structures exhaust the possibilities of subjects for equality. While segmental structures demand equality within subclasses, bloc-regarding (or, for variety, "bloc-equal") structures demand equality between subclasses. Formally: Bloc-equal structures are defined by two essential features: i) the subjects of equality are divided into two or more subclasses, and ii) equality is required between subclasses (blocs) and not within them. The first desideratum distinguishes bloc-equal structures from simple ones, and the second distinguishes bloc-equal structures from segmental ones. Let us turn at once to some issues which are unintelligible without reference to this subject structure.

A classic example of bloc-equal structure is the majority opinion in the American Constitutional law case Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). The case was a test of Louisiana's "Jim Crow" law requiring that railways "provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races." Setting aside questions of racism and good faith, notice the kind of equality embraced by the court's majority which upheld the Louisiana statute. The overall equality of black ("colored") and white accommodations must be equal. Neither particular blacks nor particular whites need be accommodated equally--to each other (segmental equality) or to members of the other race (simple equality). Rather, the two blocs, taken collectively, are to be treated equally. This is a classic bloc-equal structure, and it stands in

diametrical opposition to the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, for whom the Constitution is "color blind," and thus unable to define racial blocs: "It neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens; . . . the law regards man as man and takes no account of his color." Harlan is plainly arguing for simple, subject-regarding equality.

Next, consider the figures and tables below, all of which suggest familiar American patterns of inequality (nurtured in part by the heritage of Plessy). Table 1 describes the relationship between black and white median incomes (per household) over the period 1950-77. Figure 1 plots racial unemployment rates from 1960-74. Despite worthwhile nuances of interpretation, these both clearly indicate that Myrdal's "American dilemma" persists: Being black roughly doubles the rate of unemployment, and costs something over $7,000 per annum in median income in 1977. (An expensive luxury, blackness.)

TABLE 1

MEDIAN INCOME OF FAMILIES, BY RACE OF HEAD, 1950-1977[31]

	Current Income				Constant Income (1967)		
Year	Whites	Blacks	Absolute Difference	Ratio BL - WH Income	Whites	Blacks	Constant Dollar Differ.
1950	$ 3,445	$1,869	$1,576	.54	$4,778	$2,592	$2,186
1955	4,605	2,549	2,056	.55	5,742	3,178	2,564
1960	5,835	3,233	2,602	.55	6,576	3,643	2,933
1965	7,251	3,886	3,365	.54	7,672	4,111	3,561
1970	10,236	6,279	3,957	.61	8,803	5,400	3,403
1975	14,268	8,779	5,489	.61	8,860	5,452	3,408
1977	16,740	9,563	7,177	.57	9,274	5,298	3,976

FIGURE 1

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, BY RACE, 1960-1977[32]



Table 2 gives the median income for women over approximately the same period. The shocking feature here is the diminishing relative income of women over this period: each datum is a little worse than the one before.

TABLE 2

MEDIAN INCOME FOR WOMEN AS A PERCENT OF MEDIAN INCOME FOR MEN, 1955-74[33]

Year	Percent
1955	64
1960	61
1965	60
1970	59
1974	57

Table 3 presents a similarly dismal progression: as education increases, the relative income of women decreases (viz., the difference between medians grows from less than $3,000 for minimal education to almost $7,000 for college degree holders).

TABLE 3[34]

MEDIAN INCOME FOR MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS BY EDUCATION, 1974

Educational Level	Women's Median Earned Income	Men's Median Earned Income	Difference
Less than 8 years elementary	$5,002	$ 7,912	$2,890
8 years elementary	5,606	9,891	4,285
4 years high school	7,150	12,642	5,492
4 years college	9,523	16,240	6,717

These data document unmet requirements of equality. To see why we have a new underlying structure to reckon with, let us ask what sort of equality it would take to satisfy these requirements. Roughly, of course, it would take:

1. Black incomes being on average (or on median) equal with white incomes;
2. Black unemployment rates being equal with white ones;
3. Women's incomes being on average (or on median) equal with men's incomes.
4. Women's educations bringing on average (or on median) the same economic advantages as men's educations.

The essential point is this: <u>the full and complete achievement of these equalities would not imply the fulfillment of any simple or segmental equality</u>. Black and white median incomes, for example, might be precisely

equal, yet there could be tremendous inequality among women, among men, and within each racial group. The same point holds for all four examples, and for all further examples of bloc-regarding equality, whether by race, sex, age, native tongue, or sexual preference, and whether aimed at the distribution of income, power, prestige, or leisure. Bloc-regarding equality asks for something very different from simple and segmental equality.

The extent of this difference can hardly be exaggerated. Let us use a small hypothetical case to illustrate. Imagine an island society with ten members living in relative equality. Using bananas per day as a numeraire, the initial distribution is this: 60 apiece for 5 persons, and 40 apiece for 5 other persons. It turns out, sadly, that the five advantaged persons are all women, and five disadvantaged persons are all men. Now notice, before we get around to reform, that there is perfect segmental equality within each gender, and that the inclusive, simple equality covering all ten subjects is violated, but not very violently (the biggest gap is 20 bananas). Now a men's liberationist demands that the median attained by the two sexual blocs be made equal, so we redistribute bananas from person to person until the following norm is effected:

Person	Sex	Pre-Reform Bananas	Post-Reform Bananas
A	female	60	105
B	female	60	95
C	female	60	50
D	female	60	40
E	female	60	10
F	male	40	60
G	male	40	55
H	male	40	50
I	male	40	20
J	male	40	15

We have not wasted one

piece of fruit (500 in all, before and after redistribution), and we have fully satisfied the bloc-regarding equality in question. The median income for women (in the person of C) is 50, and the median for men (in the person of H) is also exactly 50 fruits. But notice further that:

1. inequality among women, formerly nonexistent, is now very serious;
2. inequality among men, formerly nonexistent, is now very serious;
3. overall inequality in the whole population of ten, formerly constrained between narrow limits at the top (60) and bottom (40) now spreads much farther (from 10 to 105 units);
4. not one banana has been transferred from women to men; all transfers have occurred within the two sexual blocs.

The point of all of this is to underline the strict independence of bloc-regarding equality from the two other main forms discussed above. Points 1 and 2 indicate that a "reform" fully satisfying a demand for bloc-equality can destroy segmental equality. And point 3 shows how the resolution of this same demand for bloc-equality can diminish simple equality in the same population. Policies answering to the demand for bloc-regarding equality will not necessarily work against these other equalities. But this is a logical possibility, which means that bloc-regarding equality is in no sense equivalent to the other forms of equality already discussed.

Finally we note a special difficulty raised by bloc-equality. In a society like the United States which has many inequalities and many "markers" of inequality, what we may call the pin-wheel effect explains part of the trouble underlying the DeFunis and Bakke cases. Suppose that we have a number of blocs in a society, called C_1, C_2, C_3, and so forth. These might stand for race, sex, class, ethnicity, age cohort, sexual preference, and the like. We satisfy a bloc-regarding claim based on C_1 (race) so that inequalities fall equally on both sides of the vertical line (C_1). But someone else sees C_2 (sex) as the primary cleavage, demanding equality



along that line, and yet another party sees C_3 (class) as the basic line along which equalization must occur. In carrying forward our C_1 plan we may obviously fail to satisfy the other two demands, and may actually exacerbate the inequalities which they seek to remove. Thus if B and W mark races, while M and F mark sexes, a racial emancipation of the fullest proportions might entail a movement from the status quo:

M	F	M	F	M		F	M	F	M	F
B	B	B	B	B		W	W	W	W	W
Least advantaged						Most advantaged				

to an "emancipatory" result:

F	F	F	F	F		M	M	M	M	M
W	B	W	B	W		B	W	B	W	B
Least advantaged						Most advantaged				

At least in logic, bloc-equality by race could wreck bloc equality by sex. More probably, one equality would merely fail to promote the other. If enough cleavages are invoked, and cross-cut one another, only simple equality can jointly solve all the demands for bloc equalities. If there are no simple inequalities, then there can be no inequality of incidence by race, sex, sexual preference, religion, age, and so on. Where simple inequalities remain, it is always possible to identify some criterion as a basis for further bloc equalization.

3. Two Roads to Emancipation

Nothing as complex as the question "Equality for whom?" can lead to one answer, yet we are tempted to suggest that a particular configuration of choices may be especially important.

Suppose one begins with an era of systematic inequality in which a conspicuous and fairly permanent marker, such as race, sex, or language, separates "winners" from "losers." Presumably, this system of inequality will also, for the reasons given above, approximate segmental equality: losers will be in one class and winners in another. (Things will of course actually be much more complicated, but we wish to model an ideal-type so as to accentuate a central issue.) A great many actual historical systems correspond roughly to this idealization, including the United States before 1865, South Africa today ("homelands" notwithstanding), perhaps the slave systems of ancient Greece, and some theories of male domination in families. The class structure of industrial capitalism may also bear more than a metaphorical resemblance to this model, even if one must resort to subtleties of language or dress to distinguish winners from losers.

Now imagine that an emancipatory movement arises and begins to gain enough leverage over this system to alter it in some relevant ways. Such a movement will then face a choice (which it may or may not understand) between two divergent roads toward emancipation. One sets foot upon the first by taking the existence of some advantaged class, hence also of a disadvantaged class, as given. In that case, the reform movement will aim merely to diminish the unfavorable incidence of the old inequalities upon those who bear the stigmata of former losers. It will, to alter a

phrase from the era of Vietnam, change the color of the slaves. This is bloc-regarding egalitarianism, and its eventual end is a rotation of simple inequalities, so that fewer victims are members of the once disadvantaged bloc--race, sex, language group--and so that more and more victims are drawn from the formerly advantaged bloc. This would not necessarily change the extent of inequality between classes or the distribution of persons among classes, i.e. the total population of the advantaged class and of the disadvantaged class could remain fixed. One would, in effect, redistribute the incidence of simple class-based inequality without affecting its extent.

The other road is begun by supposing that the underlying inequalities can themselves be overturned. One need not change the composition of an underclass if no such class is to exist. This is the road to simple, inclusive[35] subject-regarding equality. It is not that a proper share of former underlings, or children of underlings, will be moved up to an advantaged class, but that this class will itself be dissolved. This is apparently the path of radical egalitarianism, but only if the other dimensions of equality (see note 2) take a particular form.

Summary and Conclusion

Briefly, the definitions involved in deciding who is to be made equal to whom are:

Simple Subject-Regarding Equality: A claim of equality for one class of equals, each to be the equal of every other.

Inclusive Equality: A claim of equality X is inclusive by comparison with a claim Y if X adds some subjects to Y's subject class while subtracting none from it.

Exclusive Equality: A claim of equality Y is exclusive by comparison with a claim X if Y subtracts some subjects from X's class of equals while adding none to it.

Segmental Equality: A claim of equality for two or more classes of equals, equality being required within each class and not between classes.

Bloc-Regarding Equality: A claim of equality for two or more subject classes, equality being required between these classes (blocs) and not within them.

The most fundamental divergence among subjects concerns the first, fourth and fifth of these types. A brief table of essential differences among these may therefore be helpful:

	Simple Subject-Regarding	Segmental	Bloc-Regarding
How many classes?	1	≥ 2	≥ 2
Equality within or between classes?	Within	Within	Between

What political conclusions can we draw from this exercise, so cherished by academics, of drawing distinctions? Equality is, or at least could be, dangerous and expensive. If applied without qualifications, to the greatest extent possible, it would wipe out class differences, level market economies, bleach away the variety of human experience. This was the fate which de Tocquiville so dreaded, and who can forget his nightmare vision:

> I see an innumerable multitude of men, alike and equal, constantly circling around in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their soul. . . . Over this kind of man stands an immense, protective power which is alone responsible for securing their enjoyment and watching over their fate. . . . It does not break men's will, but softens, bends, and guides it; it seldom enjoins, but often inhibits action; it does not destroy anything, but prevents much being born; it is not at all tyrannical, but it hinders, restrains, enervates, stifles, and stultifies so much that in the end each nation is no more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the government as its shepherd. . . . Equality has prepared men for all this, predisposing them to endure it and often even regard it as beneficial.[36]

Furthermore, the vast majority of human societies have succumbed to de Tocqueville's "irresistable revolution." Colonial revolutions are commonplace; Marxist-Leninism is by now so institutionalized that it is an apologia for ruling classes; liberal reformers embrace the chance to emancipate racial and sexual minorities; Wall Street and Madison Avenue yield to no one in their enthusiasm for equality--of a particular kind. And yet --and here is the paradox which drives our endeavors--inequalities in society today are as recognizeable as they were in de Tocqueville's time. Equality is less dangerous and less expensive than it might seem.

One point of our analysis is to show how that can happen, how society can choose facets of equality which cut costs, evade danger, vitiate the dangerous ideal when it reaches the point of practice. We have described one set of vitiating choices; segmental or bloc-equality can seem--in fact, are--egalitarian from one perspective, but inegalitarian from another. Like Alice's antagonist, Humpty-Dumpty, when politicians invoke the idea of equality, "it means just what /they/ choose it to mean--neither more nor less."[37] And, like Wonderland conversations, disputes over equality seldom get far because the disputants talk past one another.

FOOTNOTES

[1]This paper is condensed and partly rewritten from our manuscript in progress, tentatively entitled *Equalities* by Douglas Rae, Douglas Yates and Jennifer Hochschild, with Joseph Morone and Carol Fessler. See also Douglas Rae, "The Egalitarian State," *Daedalus* 108 (Fall 1979):37-54.

[2]Other elements which need to be fully specified for a complete definition of equality in a particular case are: 1) the *domain* of equality, i.e. how many things do we want to equalize, and how far will we go in order to offset other things left unequal?; 2) the *range* of equality, i.e. should people have equal prospects for attaining a good, equal means for attainment, or equal amounts of the good?; 3) the *value* of equality, i.e. does equality entail identity among goods being distributed, or identity of value of the goods to the recipients?; and 4) *relative* equality, i.e. how do we decide which among several allocations is the most equal? Our book addresses each of these issues.

[3]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, translated by George Lawrence, edited by J. P. Mayer (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Anchor Books, 1969): Vol. I, p. 12. For a similar view, that equality is a singular value whose "ideal limit" is a society in which natural differences will have been ironed out, see Isaiah Berlin, "Equality" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, V. 56 (1955-56): 301-326, and reprinted by the same title in his *Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1978):81-102.

[4]For another argument that it is mistaken to see history as a movement toward ever greater equality as one essential idea, see S. F. Benn and R. S. Peters, *The Principles of Political Thought* (New York: The Free Press, 1959); see especially pp. 131-140. Their argument is more explicitly historical than ours; they argue that as soon as one generation eliminates one inegalitarian distinction the next generation creates a new one. For example, equality of opportunity arose as a weapon to attack ascriptive distinctions; it, in turn, is attacked as inegalitarian by socialists who seek equal response to need, and so on.

[5]Roger Noll, ed., *Government and the Sports Business* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974):257.

[6]Ibid., p. 250.

[7]Ibid., p. 261. This is not the case for performance levels below those required for retention in the majors.

[8]That is, at a .450 slugging percentage.

[9]Noll, op. cit., p. 263.

[10]Ibid., pp. 261-63.

[11]Ibid., p. 250.

[12]Newsweek, Sept. 5, 1977, p. 38

[13]New York Times, April 6, 1977, p. 3.

[14]John Meisel, Working Papers on Canadian Politics (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975):189.

[15]A Preliminary Report on the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965):77. Cited in Meisel, ibid., p. 189.

[16]More exactly, let us define a class of equals, S, not as a "class" in the Marxian sense but in the mathematical sense: it is a bounded set of elements, each element being a beneficiary or victim of equality in some yet-unspecified way. Now a simple subject-regarding equality is defined by the requirement of pairwise equality among all the elements of set S. Suppose that persons A, B, and C are members of S: then we must have equality between A and B, between A and C, and between B and C. If there are "n" subjects of equality in this sense, then there are n! / 2(n-2)! pairwise relations of equality to consider.

The factorial symbol "!" instructs us to multiply the given number times all smaller positive integers, e.g. 4! would read 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 = 24. This point of calculation is important only because it suggests the very rapid factorial rise in equality relations as the subject class (S) is expanded. Thus, for instance, a class of 5 equals would entail 10 pairwise relations of equality, and a class of 10 equals would entail 45 such relations, and a class of 20 equals would entail 190 such relations. The numbers quickly get out of hand.

[17]For some American revolutionaries, equality of political rights for all citizens was all that was necessary to define and ensure equality. Joel Barlow, for example, wrote in 1792, "In the United States, . . . all men are equal in their rights; it is impossible to make them otherwise. . . . This point once settled, everything is settled." Joel Barlow, Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States of Europe . . . (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U. Press, Great Seal Books, 1956; first printed 1792):15-16.

[18]Berlin, op. cit., p. 305. Italics added. Hugo Bedau also defines equality as identical shares to discrete individuals. See his "Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality," in Equality: Nomos IX, ed. by J. R. Pennock and J. C. Chapman (N.Y.: Atherton Press, 1962).

[19]Berlin, p. 305.

[20]Note that even one-word criteria may entail more than one criterion. Thus, for example, "veteran" entails (for purposes interesting to the U.S. Veteran's Administration) both having served in one or more of the Navy, Army, Air Force, etc., and having been discharged in an honorable way. Or consider the notion of a "qualified" voter, as this relates to place of residence, criminal record, compliance with registration laws, etc., etc. It would, thus, be a mistake to rest any great weight upon the idea of a simple or unitary boundary criterion.

[21]In the familiar Venn diagram,



Messrs. a, b, and c are subjects of equality in both classes, while d, e, and f are subjects of equality only in Class One. It follows that the first is inclusionary vis-à-vis the second in the strict sense we intend.

[22]Cf. Immanual Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For evidence on income distributions in Western nations, see Malcolm Sawyer, "Income Distribution in OECD Countries," OECD Economic Outlook, Occasional Studies, 1976. For measures that include more nations, but are much rougher estimates, see Harold Lydell, The Structure of Earnings (Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 1968); Frederic Pryor, Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U. Press, 1973); Peter Wiles, Distribution of Income: East and West (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1974).

[23]"The Gospel According to Matthew," The New English Bible, with the Apocrypha (England: Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, 1970):28.

[24]For example, much of the impetus for, and opposition to, welfare reform in the U.S. in the 1970s stemmed from the fact that AFDC payments, whose levels are set by the states, range from a $60 a month maximum for a family of four in Mississippi to a $533 maximum for the same family in Hawaii. Both the Family Assistance Plan proposed in 1969 by President Nixon and the Better Jobs and Incomes Act proposed in 1977 by President Carter called for the federal goverment to set a national minimum level of payments. See Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income (New York: Random House, 1973); Vincent Burke and Vee Burke, Nixon's Good Deed (N.Y.: Columbia U. Press, 1974); J. Storey, R. Harris, F. Levy, A. Zechter, and R. Michel, "The Better Jobs and Income Plan" (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1978); Margaret Sulvetta, "The Impact of Welfare Reform on Benefits for the Poor" (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1978).

[25]Note also that inclusivity and exclusivity do not at all exhaust the possible relations between two classes. Indeed, for two non-identical sets, A and B, we may have four basic relations, as shown in these Venn diagrams:



Only the first two are nested in the way suggested by our current discussion. The other relations do occur among classes of equals and would-be equals. We have merely singled out a particularly salient special case in this section.

[26]We assume X U ~ X exhausts S, and that X∩ ~ X is empty.

[27]Though not as simply as one might imagine. Cf. Max Weber, Economy and Society, Volume 1, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978), especially pp. 255-56. For analyses of the "great chain of being," see Ewart Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 2 vols. (New York: Knopf, 1954); A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. Press, 1936); Paul Sigmund, "Hierarchy, Equality, and Consent in Medieval Christian Thought," in Nomos IX: Equality, op. cit. Although the idea reached its height in feudal society, it began much earlier and persisted much later. Aristotle argued that "there is no inequality if unequals are treated in proportion to their mutual inequality," and even more explicitly:

> The soul rules the body with the sort of authority of a master. . . . It is clearly natural and beneficial to the body that it should be ruled by the soul, . . . whereas the equality of the two elements, or their reverse relation, is always detrimental. What holds good in a man's inner life also holds good outside it. . . . The relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior--of the ruling to the ruled. . . . It is thus clear that, just as some are by nature free, others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition of slavery is both beneficial and just.

See The Politics of Aristotle, edited and translated by Ernest Barker (London: Oxford U. Press, 1946):13-14.

Edmund Burke exemplified a secularized view of the great chain of being, a belief which persists today. See Eric Nordlinger, The Working Class Tories (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1967); Robert McKenzie and Allan Silver, Angels in Marble (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1968); Duane Lockwood, "Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society," The Sociological Review 14 (November 1966): 249-267. Note that segmental equality need not imply degradation or self-abnegation of segments below the top. Deferential Englishmen feel themselves the moral, if not social, equals of the elite because "they appear to accept the classic doctrine that all who properly fulfill their stations in life contribute worthily to the

public good" (McKenzie and Silver, op. cit., p. 249). See also Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (N.Y.: Praeger, 1971):84. Lower-class deferentials, in fact, are more likely to see themselves as middle class than are lower-class non-deferentials. Acceptance of segmental equality apparently involves a gain in one's sense of one's own prestige, at least in England (McKenzie and Silver, op. cit. :196). For another argument that segmental equality may be the most psychologically satisfying form of equality, see David Potter, People of Plenty (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1954):97-110.

[28]This discussion of course gives Marx's interpretations neither the credit nor the criticism it deserves. In fact, what to say on this point would divide the authors of this essay against one another. We do, however, agree that a reading of Capital, Vol. I is the best foundation upon which to begin such a discussion. See also Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," New Left Review 100 (1976):5-78. Anderson argues that political and legal equality through representative democracy is "the principal ideological lynchpin of Western capitalism" because "the state 'represents' the totality of the population abstracted from its distribution into social classes, as individual and equal citizens. . . . The economic divisions within the citizenry are masked by the juridical parity between" wealthy and poor. The distinction between economic inequality and political equality "is then constantly presented to the masses as the ultimate incarnation of liberty. " For a similar argument, in a non-Marxist framework, see C. E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1977): Part 5.

It is also interesting to note that people seem to create their own masking system, by making equality-inequality, or "relative deprivation" comparisons only within relatively short intervals above and below their own place in a system of unequal distribution. Cf. W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). For more recent evidence, see Martin Harrop, Equality and Democracy (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1979). Social psychologists discuss the same phenomenon as social comparison theory. See Leon Festinger in "A Theory of Social Comparison Processes," Human Relations 7(1954):117-140; and Thomas Pettigrew, "Social Evaluation Theory," in David Levine (ed.) Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Vol. 15 (Lincoln: U. of Nebraska Press):241-318. For a warning about the possible destabilizing effects of narrow social comparisons, see Albert O. Hirschman with Michael Rothschild, "The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development," Quarterly Journal of Economics 87 (1973): 544-566.

[29]Quality within each such category can then serve as another segmenting criterion, e.g. shortstops hitting .220 are segmented from shortstops hitting .300, etc. See Roger Noll, Government and the Sports Business (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973).

[30]See especially Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959); Anthony Giddens,

The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (New York: Harper and Row, 1973); David Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1971); Milovan Djitas, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1957).

Some writers have mistakenly argued that the U.S., because it has no inherited classes, in the ascriptive sense, and no clear class structure, in the traditional Marxist sense, provides simple subject-regarding equality for its citizens. De Tocqueville, for example, looking at the U.S. with the eyes of a post-French Revolution aristocrat, was struck by the absence of laws of primogeniture, sumptuary laws, and other indices of fixed classes. He equated this absence of legal segmentation with the absence of inequality, thus leading to his famous, and wrong, claim of "equality of condition" among white American men. See de Tocqueville, op. cit.

Seymour Martin Lipset makes the same mistake more subtly in his argument that "cross-cutting cleavages make a more vital democracy." America has no fixed, rigid social classes as Marx would describe them--or at least no awareness of having such classes. Instead, important interests and commitments of many citizens cut across class lines, thereby decreasing the dangers of underclass radicalism and upper-class elitism. Lipset, and others who argue that the U.S. is a middle-class society, go wrong in two ways, however. First, he assumes that the absence of clear, unbreachable boundaries between subclasses means that there are no subclasses at all. Second, he assumes that the absence of structural inequalities is the same thing as the presence of simple subject-regarding equality, i.e. that eliminating a segmental system is sufficient, as well as necessary, to give each citizen an equal role in a democracy. See Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1963):80ff.

[31]U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-23, No. 54, "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population of the United States, 1974" (Washington: GPO, 1975), table 9; CPR, P-60, No. 116, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States, 1977." "Black" income prior to 1964 actually comprises "Negro and Other Races." Cited in Edwin Dorn, Rules and Racial Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979):35-37.

[32]U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment and Earnings," Vol. 24, No. 10 (October 1977), chart 11. Cited in Dorn, ibid., p. 43.

[33]U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, The Earnings Gap Between Women and Men (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 6, cited in Janet K. Boles, The Politics of the Equal Rights Amendment: Conflict and the Decision Process (New York: Longman, Inc., 1979), p. 49.

[34]The Earnings Gap, ibid., p. 10, cited in Boles, ibid., p. 48.

[35]"Inclusive" in relation to the advantaged class of equals in the original, pre-emancipatory state of things. While the advantages of

membership would presumably decline, the boundaries would expand. Notice that the inclusive-exclusive distinction is most readily formulated for claims which are simply subject-regarding, but can also be applied to the segmental and bloc-regarding structures. Thus, say, we might require bloc-equal treatment for male and female political scientists (very exclusionary), then expand this to all professionals (inclusionary), then to all the world's men and women (even more inclusionary).

[36]de Tocqueville, op. cit., pp. 691-692.

[37]The full passage is intriguing in this context:

"When I use a word," Humpty-Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all."

See Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There in The Annotated Alice, by Lewis Carroll, Introduction and Notes by Martin Gardner (U.S.: Bramhall House, 1960):269.